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COMMENTS
NET WORTH AND PROOF OF TAX EVASION
On December 6, 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States approved a
method of establishing a criminal violation of the Internal Revenue Code'
which materially lessens the amount of evidence required of the government to
obtain a conviction. The Court was faced with the problem of allowing a prac-
tical method of proving a criminal violation of the revenue laws on the one
hand, while still preserving to the accused his right to require the government
to prove him guilty and not force him to prove himself innocent. On that day
in four companion cases,2 the Court delivered its answer to the problem by
affirming lower court decisions which approved the so-called net worth method
of establishing taxable income.
The net worth method, as used by the government, is one by which the
prosecution is enabled to prove taxable income by first establishing the value of
the total assets of the defendant at the beginning of the tax year for which he
was indicted for tax evasion. This is called the opening net worth. Second, the
government then shows the expenditures of the defendant during the year in
question. The next step is for the government to show the value of the total
assets of the defendant at the end of the year.
The expenditures of the taxpayer are added to his closing net worth. From
this total is taken the opening net worth and the income reported by the tax-
payer on his return. The result of this calculation is the amount of income of the
taxpayer which he did not report on his return. The following formula illus-
trates this calculation:
(Expenditures + closing net worth) - (Opening net worth +
reported income) = Unreported income.
1 The prosecution in all four cases was under § 145 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code o,
1939, 26 U.S.C.A. § 145(b) (1945). The section provides: "Any person required under this
chapter to collect, account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this chapter, who willfully
fails to collect or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, and any person who willfully
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this chapter or the payment
thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon
conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than five
years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution."
The provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which now covers the situation in the
cases is § 7201, 26 U.S.C.A. § 7201 (1954) which reads: "Any person who willfully at-
tempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof
shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both,
together with the costs of prosecution."
2Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954); Friedberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 142
(1954); Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954); United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S.
160 (1954).
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From the unreported income, any non-taxable income is deducted of which
the government has been apprised. The prosecution then argues to the jury
that the remaining sum constitutes the unreported taxable income for the year.
The factual situations in the cases necessitate some variation on this general
statement of the net worth method and it is necessary for the government to
establish more than just unreported taxable income before a conviction can be
obtained. These aspects are considered later in the paper. The operation of
the net worth method can be seen by considering how it was used in the four
cases decided by the Supreme Court.
The case in which the net worth doctrine is most extensively treated is
Holland v. United States,3 the unanimous opinion of the Court being delivered by
Mr. Justice Clark.4 Mr. and Mrs. Holland were convicted of wilfully at-
tempting to evade or defeat their income tax for 1948 by understating their tax
liability. Mr. Holland was indicted for tax evasion for 1946 and 1947, and
both were charged with evasion for 1948. He was acquitted of the charges con-
cerning 1946 and 1947. The government introduced evidence tending to show
an increase in the defendants' net worth for the year 1948 of approximately
$32,000 while the reported income was only $12,000 and also showed a pos-
sible source of income by proving that the hotel and restaurant owned by the
Hollands could have accounted for this increase, based on the profits reported
by the former owners. It was the contention of the Hollands that the money ex-
pended during the period of prosecution represented an accumulation which
they had saved for a considerable number of years prior to 1946 and therefore
the government's opening net worth figure was understated. They maintained
that the money, totaling $113,000, plus hundreds of shares of stock, was kept
in a canvas bag, a suitcase, and a metal box with $104,000 of it accumulated
prior to 1933, and that it was not until 1946 that any of it was spent. The gov-
ernment attempted to refute this contention by showing that during the period
the defendants claimed they were accumulating, they maintained a very low
standard of living, were forced to separate for eight years because it was to
their economic advantage, and allowed their furniture to be taken because of a
balance of $92.20 owing on it.
On appeal from their conviction, the defendants contended that the net
worth system is not an accurate method of determining income, that the effect
of its use is to shift the burden of proof to the taxpayer to show that the in-
creases do not reflect taxable income for the period of prosecution, and that the
method should be restricted to situations where the taxpayer keeps either in-
adequate or no records. The Court, while recognizing the inherent weaknesses
and dangers of convictions based upon this system, approved its use although
3 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
4 The Court was unanimous in all of the net worth cases except the Calderon case, in
which Mr. Justice Douglas dissented without opinion. The opinion of the Court was de-
livered by Mr. Justice Clark in all four cases.
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cautioning the lower courts to exercise care to protect the rights of the de-
fendant.
In the second of the net worth cases, Friedberg v. United States,5 the conten-
tion of the defendant on appeal was limited to the adequacy of the govern-
ment's proof of the opening net worth. He maintained the government failed
to take into consideration, in determining his opening net worth, a hoard of cash
and securities valued at between $50,000 and $100,000, which the defendant
claimed he had at that time. The government, to show that he did not have any
such sum before 1944, the first year of prosecution, established that Friedberg
had no taxable income from 1922 to 1937 except when he paid nominal taxes
for 1923 through 1925. Also a mortgage on his home was foreclosed in 1937
and a deficiency judgment resulting therefrom for $ 3500 could not be collected
in 1939. In 1940 a levy on a judgment for $13.76 was returned nulla bona. The
Court held that from the above facts the jury could conclude that the de-
fendant did not have such a reserve.
The next case in the series was Smith v. United States' where the defendant's
principal contention was that a statement containing an admission of his open-
ing net worth should not be admitted in evidence. Smith was under the impres-
sion that he was settling a civil tax liability, with no thought of prosecution,
when he signed the statement prepared by the government and his accountant.
The defendant maintained that the statement was inadmissible because of the
government's promise of immunity from criminal prosecution and further that
the statement was not sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence. The
government denied a promise of immunity. The Court held that the question of
immunity was one of fact for the jury, and that their findings were supported
by the evidence. As to the defendant's second contention, the Court held that
the statement was sufficiently corroborated to be admissible, even though the
corpus delicti was not established independently of the admission.
The last of the foundation cases of the net worth doctrine was United States v.
Calderon7 where the Court was faced with the problem of having sufficient cor-
roboration of the defendant's admission to a government agent concerning his
opening net worth which was necessary to sustain the convictions for tax eva-
sion in 1946, 1947, 1948, and 1949. Although there was not sufficient proof
without that admission to sustain three of the four convictions, the defendant at
the trial testified in such a manner as to show that over the four-year period he
was guilty of evading taxes. The Court struggled with the requirement that one
be proved guilty of tax evasion for each year individually and seemed to solve
the problem by a series of inconsistent statements which can only lead to con-
fusion. The Court held:
348 U.S. 142 (1954).
6 348 U.S. 147 (1954).
7 348 U.S. 160 (1954).
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While the evidence as -a whole must show a deficiency for each of the prosecution
years, the corroborative evidence suffices if it shows a substantial deficiency for the
over-all prosecution period .... Although the evidence was insufficient to corroborate
the opening net worth directly, we find the independent proof of tax evasion entirely
adequate. 8
NET WORTH BEFORE THE HOLLAND CASE
This is not the first time that the Supreme Court has been presented with the
problem of net worth in some form. In United States v. Johnson9 the Court was
required to pass on the use of a net worth system to establish the income of sev-
eral gambling establishments which it was alleged the defendant owned. In this
case the books of the establishments were destroyed, so the government had no
recourse to the business records to prove income. The principal contention of
Johnson was that he had no interest in the gambling houses and therefore their
income was not taxable to him ". . . . the only real problem before the jury
[was] when he [Johnson] swore that he 'never had any financial interest in any
gambling club .... . "10
After showing that Johnson actually controlled the clubs, the government
then proceeded to show the taxable income of the clubs by the use of a net
worth method. Although Johnson never seriously contended that this method
was inappropriate, the Court summarily disposed of the argument by pointing
out that when there are no actual records in existence, this is the only practical
way of proving an income. If the Court were to have held otherwise, it would
allow a taxpayer to escape conviction for income tax evasion by the simple
expediency of disposing of all of his business and personal records.
The Johnson case differed from what we now know as the classic net worth
case by virtue of the fact that there was no contention of a non-taxable source
of income. All the income involved in the case was admittedly taxable; the net
worth method was used to determine the amount of the income. Thus the case
was never considered to give a blanket approval to the net worth method.
The net worth method came into its own at the much publicized trial of Al
Capone when the government used the income tax laws to do what federal and
local officials had been trying unsuccessfully for years to accomplish-convict
the most important gangland leader of the prohibition era of a crime." The
method was used to show the amount of income received from the sale of beer
to the speakeasies of the Chicago area. This evidence did not need to stand on
its own however, but acted only to corroborate direct evidence of the income.
Capone's principal defense other than procedural matters was that the profits
of the enterprise were not actually his and therefore not taxable to him. The
discussion of the net worth method by the Court of Appeals was limited as the
I United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160, 168-169 (1954).
9 319 U.S. 503 (1943).
10 Ibid., at 516.
11 Capone v. United States, 51 F. 2d 609 (C.A. 7th, 1931).
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court was only called upon to approve the method as corroborative rather than
primary evidence.
The next year the same court had occasion to pass upon net worth in a simi-
lar case-both as to facts and personalities. In Guzik v. United States" Capone's
business manager and financial consultant found that the government had as
much interest in his income tax returns as those of his now incarcerated associ-
ate's. The only important difference in the two cases was that Guzik's income
was purportedly from gambling receipts while that of Capone was from the
purveying of beer. 3 These cases acted as the pioneers in obtaining judicial ap-
proval for the use of net worth in criminal prosecutions. Prior to the recent
pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the use of the net worth method has been
approved and extended by the lower courts .14
ESTABLISHING THE OPENING NET WORTH
The whole structure of a net worth prosecution is built upon the establish-
ment of the opening net worth. In order for the government to be able to prove
that the expenditures of the taxpayer during the period of prosecution were at-
tributable to income received in that year and not from prior savings, the gov-
ernment needs to establish that this is not possible due to lack of any fund from
which such expenditures might come.
The government is faced with a difficult problem in attempting to establish
an opening net worth. It must be careful to include all of the assets of the indi-
vidual at the beginning of the period. To obtain the necessary information, the
government usually approaches the taxpayer first. If the taxpayer does not
furnish this information, the government is placed in a position of having to
send its investigators out to obtain the data. The real and personal property of
the taxpayer must be evaluated. The government needs to locate his banking
facilities to discover his cash assets and obtain possible clues as to other prop-
erty which he may own. Obtaining this information is a long and tedious proc-
ess which will effect a practical limitation on the use of the method. Even after
all of this investigating, there is no assurance that at the time of the trial the
taxpayer will not be able to show other assets which were not included by the
government and which would effectually negate the prosecution's case.
The method preferred by the government to establish the opening net worth
of the taxpayer is to obtain an admission, as this is the simplest and most eco-
12 54 F. 2d 618 (C.A. 7th, 1932).
11 Lest the reader think that this difference is not important, let him compare Rutkin v.
United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952) with Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946)
where income from extortion was held taxable, while income from embezzlement was con-
sidered non-taxable.
11 Pollock v. United States, 202 F. 2d 281 (C.A. 5th, 1953); United States v. Yeoman-
Henderson, Inc., 193 F. 2d 867 (C.A. 7th, 1952); Leeby v. United States, 192 F. 2d 331
(C.A. 8th, 1951); Gariepy v. United States, 189 F. 2d 459 (C.A. 6th, 1951); Bell v. United
States, 185 F. 2d 302 (C.A. 4th, 1951); Brodella v. United States, 184 F. 2d 823 (C.A. 6th,
1950); Schuermann v. United States, 174 F. 2d 397 (C.A. 8th, 1949)..
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nomical method of establishing it. From the taxpayer's standpoint the discus-
sion of his opening net worth with a government agent is fraught with danger.,
Although the taxpayer may be under the impression that it might be a routine
inquiry or connected only with the settlement of a civil tax liability, his admis-
sion as to the value of his assets as of a given date may be used to establish the
opening net worth in a criminal prosecution. Although the taxpayer usually is
only too willing to give to the government agent all the information which he
desires, and in most situations this is not only proper but desirable, in the in-
stances where the taxpayer has already acted to give rise to a possible criminal
prosecution he might by such statements give the government all the informa-
tion it needs to obtain the conviction. Therefore in those instances it might be
better for the taxpayer to have legal counsel before making any statements to
the agent. The defendants' positions in the Smith and Calderon cases will serve
to illustrate this point.
In Smith the government's proof of opening net worth was based on a state-
ment given by the defendant to an Internal Revenue agent in the belief that all
that was involved was the settlement of a civil tax liability. He thought that the
case would be closed when he paid his tax and penalities.)6 In the Calderon case
the situation was similar to that of Smith in that the basis of the government's
opening net worth allegation was the admissions of the defendant while talking
to the government agent and signing a statement prepared by his accountant
and the government agent. Calderon maintained at the trial that he relied on his
accountant as to the accuracy of the statement he signed while the accountant
testified that he had not verified the particular figures in the written statement.
While recognizing the danger of admitting the statement, the Court neverthe-
less held that these were circumstances for the jury to consider in giving
credence to the statement, and allowed its admission in evidence. 6
The opening net worth in the Holland case was not so easily established. The
government had to make an independent investigation to ascertain his assets.
The opening net worth figure arrived at by this investigation was $32,803.09 in
assets with liabilities of $12,650.50. Holland admitted that this was true in so
far as it went, but he contended that he had in addition $113,000 in currency
and a considerable amount of stock which he had accumulated over a period of
years prior to the period of prosecution. In this case it was the job of the prose-
cution to negate the possibility of the existence of such a hoard, which was done
by showing the defendant's impoverished condition during the years he was
supposedly accumulating this fund.' 7
The handling of the opening net worth in the Friedberg case was similar to
that of Holland. The government used a negative approach by submitting that
he had no cash on hand and also that his standard of living was low and many
"Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954).
"United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160 (1954).
17 Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
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debts were left unpaid during the years in which Friedberg claimed to have
accumulated between $50,000 and $100,000, which he contended was his open-
ing net worth. The type of evidence which the government uses to negate
claimed hoards is illustrated in the Friedberg case. There the government intro-
duced all the income tax forms which the taxpayer had filed to'show that he
did not receive, from taxable sources at least, sufficient income toenable him to
accumulate such a sum. It also showed the various judgments rendered by state
courts against the defendant which were never collected. A loan application
was also introduced where the taxpayer stated his total assets. The Court was
of the opinion that this was sufficient to allow the jury to decide that the de-
fendant had no cash assets at the beginning of the period of prosecution.' 8
It might be noted that Smith's wife was also indicted with him but that a
motion for acquittal was granted as to her. It is significant that the net worth
statement concerning Smith and his wife was signed only by him and that the
government was then enabled to obtain a conviction against him, but that his
wife, who didn't sign an opening net worth statement of any type, was ac-
quitted. Therefore it becomes evident that it is extremely difficult for the gov-
ernment to obtain a net worth conviction without an admission by the taxpayer
concerning his opening net worth.
USE OF LEADS TO SOURCES OF INCOME
In order to establish an opening net worth figure that is representative of the
taxpayer's financial status at the beginning of the period of prosecution, an in-
vestigation into possible sources of his current financial position must be under-
taken. It is incumbent upon the government to produce an accurate figure of
opening net worth. Therefore the question is presented as to how extensive its
investigation of these possible sources must be. How far back into the tax-
payer's past must the government go to ascertain income from which possible
savings could be derived? Would it have to check for possible non-taxable
sources of income, such as gift or inheritance, by looking at the records of the
local probate court or other depositories of such records? Is it necessary to
check with the banks and other places where similar funds can be kept in the
vicinity of the taxpayer to determine what reserves he has on hand? How ex-
tensive need the check be with the taxpayer's creditors to find out whether he
made any statements concerning his financial status which may be used as
admissions, and also to discover any liabilities which would reduce his net
worth?
The answers to these questions differ depending upon the amount of co-oper-
ation, or lack thereof, by the taxpayer with the government agents. The tax-
payer may give to the agent either no leads, leads that are remote, or relevant
leads that are reasonably susceptible of being investigated. Pertaining to the
"I Friedberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 142 (1954).
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situation when defendant has furnished the agent with relevant leads, the Court
pointed out:
While sound administration of the criminal law requires that the net worth approach
-a powerful method of proving otherwise undetectable offenses-should not be denied
the Government, its failure to investigate leads furnished by the taxpayer might result
in serious injustice. It is, of course, not for us to prescribe investigative procedures, but
it is within the province of the courts to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to
convict. When the Government rests its case solely on the approximations and circum-
stantial inferences of a net worth computation, the cogency of its proof depends upon
its effective negation of reasonable explanations by the taxpayer inconsistent with guilt.
Such refutation might fail when the Government does not track down relevant leads
furnished by the taxpayer-leads reasonably susceptible of being checked, which, if
true, would establish the taxpayer's innocence. When the Government fails to show an
investigation into the validity of such leads, the trial judge may consider them as true
and the Government's case insufficient to go to the jury."
The Court thus recognizes the danger of requiring the taxpayer to assume
the burden of proving his opening net worth when he furnishes the government
such leads. The Court felt that this requirement of checking will tend to miti-
gate against the dangers inherent in this type of prosecution.
In the case where the leads furnished by the taxpayer are of the remote type,
the duty imposed upon the government to follow them up is less exacting. By
remote type of lead, it is meant that type of statement made by the taxpayer
which indicates a source of present assets which would be difficult, if not im-
possible, to verify, by virtue of the fact that records or other evidence of the
transaction are not available because none were ever made or because they are
now missing. The difficulty of investigation may also be due to the remoteness
in time of the incident or that some of the parties have since died. An example of
this would be when the taxpayer claims that he received a gift from a relative
who is now deceased and that he retained the gift and did not start spending it
until the period of prosecution. In the Holland case the defendant claimed that
he had held money received from the sale of two caf6s in the 1920's and the sale
of gold in 1933 totaling $113,000 which he did not start to spend until 1946. The
government did not investigate this explanation given it by Holland. Neverthe-
less, the Court, in allowing the conviction to stand, held that since these trans-
actions were so remote, in conjunction with evidence of subsequent events, the
jury could have found that even if the situation in 1933 was as claimed by Hol-
land, he did not have such a sum on hand at the beginning of 1946.
Apparently the Supreme Court will be satisfied that the government has suf-
ficiently established its case without investigating into the remote type of lead.
It was considered an impossible task for the government to check this sort of
lead.
The Court did not actually consider the situation where the taxpayer fur-
nishes no leads and in effect refuses to co-operate with the government's in-
9 Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 135, 136 (1954).
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vestigation of his assets at the beginning of the period of prosecution. Therefore
we cannot be sure how much evidence of an opening net worth the Court would
require in this situation. However, the Court in the Holland case recognized the
dangers inherent in the use of the net worth system in a criminal prosecution
and because of this there would seem to be little likelihood that the Court
would tolerate the government attempting to build its proof of opening net
worth on a summary investigation. The government in all probability would
be required to show a reasonable inquiry to ascertain the financial status of the
defendant even after the refusal of co-operation.
ESTABLISHING THE EXISTENCE OF UNREPORTED TAXABLE INCOME
After the opening net worth has been determined, the government usually
attempts to show expenditures made during the year of prosecution which
could not be accounted for, by taking the opening net worth in addition to the
reported income of the taxpayer, and subtracting his closing net worth. The
resultant total, which represents the total unreported income for the period in
question, indicates a source of taxable income, or possibly non-taxable income
from gifts and inheritances. The problem of the government at this point in the
case is to establish that the unreported receipts are classified in the former cate-
gory. The position of the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings is thus
stated by the Court:
Increases in net worth, standing alone, cannot be assumed to be attributable to cur-
rently taxable income. But proof of a likely source, from which the jury could reason-
ably find that the net worth increases sprang, is sufficient.21
It is now incumbent upon the government to produce evidence of these rea-
sonable sources of taxable income. In the Holland case, a likely source of tax-
able income was established as being the hotel and restaurant owned and oper-
ated by the defendants. It was shown that over $12,500 of receipts in 1948 were
not reflected in the books of the business. Also the reported income of the
enterprise under Holland's management was considerably less than that re-
ported by the previous owner even though the business had seemed to increase.
The Supreme Court held that this was sufficient proof of a taxable source of
income from which a jury could reasonably find that the increases in net worth
had resulted, so the government had sustained its burden on this point.
When the prosecution involves more than one year, a problem is presented
as to how the government will show which year the unreported taxable income
was received. Under the annual accounting concept, which considers each
year's taxes as a separate item, the proof of which year the evasion was ac-
complished should be required of the prosecution. The proof of exactly which
year the unreported taxable income was attributed to is especially difficult in
those cases where the prosecution is for several years and the proved opening
net worth of the taxpayer would cover the expenditures of one year, but not of
21 Ibid., at 137, 138.
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the others. In such a case, the classic theory of the annual accounting concept
would require that the government prove exactly which years the unreported
taxable income was attributable to, as the evasion for each year is to be con-
sidered a separate offense. The Court was faced with this problem in the
Calderon case where the question was the extent of the corroboration of the
defendant's extra-judicial admissions that indicated a deficiency in each of the
years of prosecution. The corroborative evidence only indicated a deficiency for
the period as a whole. The Court considered that this was sufficient, stating:
While the evidence as a whole must show a deficiency for each of the prosecution
years, the corroborative evidence suffices if it shows a substantial deficiency for the
over-all prosecution period.21
Thus, the Calderon case holds that, at least as far as the corroborative evi-
dence is concerned, the "niceties of the annual accounting concept" need not be
followed, If the departure from the use of the annual accounting concept is ex-
tended, the need of the government to establish the exact year of the receipt
will be diminished. The Calderon case may be a step toward the reduction in the
requirement that the prosecution show the exact year of the receipt. The
weakening of this requirement will make the case of the prosecution easier to
prove. From the holding of the Calderon case the evidenciary requirement that
is placed on the prosecution would appear to be that the government must
prove unreported taxable income for the entire period of prosecution, and then
introduce some evidence that the evasions occurred in each of the years charged
in the indictment. But the amount of evidence that is demanded for this later
purpose seems slight. The use of the annual accounting concept in criminal net
worth prosecutions is, while not being abolished, reduced in importance, so as
to make relying on it as a defense, of doubtful sagacity.
Another problem facing the Court, caused by the necessity to ascertain the
year of the unreported taxable income, was the assumption made by the govern-
ment that the year assets were discovered by the Internal Revenue Service was
the same as the year of their receipt by the taxpayer. In the Calderon case a gov-
ernment agent testified that assets were regarded as income in the year of their
discovery. The propriety of this practice was not commented on by the Court.
The lack of a need on the part of the government to prove any specific amount
of taxable income that was not reported may have influenced the Court in this
attitude. But there is still a need of showing that at least some of the income was
attributable to each of the years of the prosecution in order to convict for all,
and because many of the sentences imposed are concurrent should not cause the
Court to overlook this requirement.
THE ELEMENT OF WILLFULNESS
Another element necessary to the government's case is that the willful in-
tent to evade the tax must be present, as required by the Internal Revenue
21 United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160, 168 (1954).
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Code. The defendants in all four of the net worth cases were charged with the
willful attempt to evade and defeat their income taxes, not with the charge of
willful failure to pay a tax. In the Holland case, the evidence of the prosecution
established, at most, an increase in the net worth of the taxpayer not reflected in
his books. No errors in the records of Holland are shown; there is just a naked
increase in his net worth. In the past, some affirmative action was required for
conviction, in addition to the bare unreporting of income. This usually con-
sisted in some errors or omissions in the taxpayer's books and records. In the
Holland case, there was no evidence of any irregularity in the books to supply
the affirmative act usually needed. This failure of the Court to require any
specific affirmative act would seem to eradicate the line between the evasion of
taxes and the charge of willful failure to pay a tax. Proof of a willful failure to
pay a tax is now sufficient to establish a case of the willful attempt to evade a
tax. The blending of these two concepts is indicated by a statement of the
Court:
But when the Government uses the net worth method, and the books and records of
the taxpayer appear correct on their face, an inference of willfulness from net worth
increases alone might be unjustified, especially where the circumstances surrounding the
deficiency are as consistent with innocent mistake as with willful violation. On the
other hand, the very failure of the books to disclose a proved deficiency might indicate
deliberate falsification.22
The specific affirmative act requirement is thus apparently dispensed with by
the Court. This blending of evasion and the failure to pay is further illustrated
by the Court's citing of the case of Spies v. United States,23 a case dealing with
the willful failure to pay, rather than to evade.
In the case of Smith ,v. United States 4 the Court also considered the willful-
ness element. In the brief discussion of willfulness in this case, the statement is
made that when the opening net worth is established, the remainder of the net
worth calculation, as to unreported increases in assets, "amply establishes a
consistent understatement by petitioner of his taxable income; and from this
the jury could infer willfulness. '25 A consistency in unreporting large amounts
of income, proved by the net worth method, is declared to be sufficient evidence
from which a jury may find a willful evasion, such evidence being considered
hardly sufficient by the Spies case to support a charge of willful failure to pay
the tax. The need of an affirmative act to show willful evasion seems to be no
longer required.
In the other two net worth cases, Calderon and Friedberg, the Court did not
discuss the problem of willfulness. The evidence of this element of the crime is
not stated; there is just the declaration that there is sufficient evidence of tax
evasion.
22Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 128 (1954).
23 317 U.S. 492 (1943). 24 348 U.S. 147 (1954). 21 Ibid., at 157.
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Thus, as to the element of willfulness in a net worth prosecution, the need of
proof on behalf of the government of some affirmative action on the part of the
taxpayer apart from the ordinary buildup of a record of unreported income in-
herent in the net worth system of proof, appears to be no longer necessary.
This development will ease the burden of establishing a criminal violation of
the revenue laws on the part of the government. Willfulness will now seem to
follow automatically from the proof of the other elements in the case, no proof
of a particular incident indicating it being necessary. The use by the Court of
the term "tax evasion" in the Friedberg and the Calderon cases to indicate all the
elements of the crime, including willfulness, without an attempt to separate
them further, indicates that the willful attempt to evade, as an element of the
offense, has now lost its separate identity, and the jury will be permitted to
infer it from evidence of the other elements of the crime of willful tax evasion.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF
In the ordinary criminal case, the burden of proof rests on the prosecution to
show that the accused is guilty beyond all reasonable doubt. This rule is also
considered to apply to criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code. Even
in the net worth cases the Court declares this to be the rule. The most serious
question as to where the burden of proof rests concerns evidence of the taxable
source of the net worth increases shown by the prosecution to the jury. Where
there are no leads furnished by the defendant, and if the defendant claims that
the increases in net worth are from non-taxable sources, the burden of intro-
ducing evidence on this point seems now to rest on the taxpayer. The only
duty on the part of the government is to investigate those leads of the defendant
that are reasonably susceptible of being checked; otherwise the defendant is
left the responsibility of showing that the increases in his net worth were the
result of non-taxable sources, and not taxable income. In support of this, the
Court relies on the case of Yee Hem v. United States,26 a case concerning the
validity of a presumption created by statute that opium found in one's posses-
sion is presumed to have been imported after April 1, 1909. The Court held
this presumption valid and upheld the conviction. The applicability of this case
to the net worth doctrine is difficult to see. In the Fee Hem case the presumption
is created by statute, and there is no statutory presumption that all income is
taxable created by the Internal Revenue Code. Also, under the holding in the
case of Tot v. United States27 the creation of a presumption, even by statute,
must be reasonably connected with the facts to be proved. The presumption
held invalid in this case was that created by § 2(f) of the Federal Firearms
Act. 8 It provided that the possession of a firearm by any person convicted of
26 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
27 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
2852 Stat. 1250 (1938), 15 U.S.C.A. § 902(f) (1948).
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a crime of violence should be presumptive evidence that the firearm was
shipped in interstate commerce, and also that the receipt occurred after the
effective date of the statute (July 30, 1938). The lack of a rational connection
between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed is given as the reason
for holding the presumption invalid. Applying this principle to the Court-
created presumption that an increase in net worth is attributable to taxable
income, can it be said that it is a rational presumption from the proof of income
that it is from a taxable source, any more than the firearm was transported in in-
tcrstate commerce? On this question the Court appears to now take a more
liberal view of the creation of a presumption.
Also cited by the Supreme Court in its net worth cases was the case of
Rossi v. United States29 on the question of burden of proof. This case was a
prosecution for the operation of an unlicensed distillery, the burden of proof
being placed on the defendant to show that he had a license. This holding is in
keeping with the general rule that the burden of producing evidence of a license
is on the defendant when this is relied on as a defense. The extension of this rule
to the net worth case on the basis that the proof of a license is analogous to the
proof of a non-taxable source of income does not seem warranted. For the
defendant to produce a license when he is relying on this as a defense does not
place much of a burden on him, as all the defendant has to do is to produce the
license. This would be comparatively easy for the accused, but almost impos-
sible for the government to go through all of its records in order to show that
no license had been issued, and it is primarily because of this difficulty that this
burden is placed on the defendant. But when this rule is applied to the net worth
cases, the effect is not the same as in the license cases. The difficulty of the
taxpayer in satisfying a jury that the increase in net worth was from a non-
taxable source may be just as great to him as it would be to the government.
Finding evidence of old transactions, as of gifts made a long time ago, may be
next to impossible for the defendant as well as the prosecution'. Also, if the
defendant is obliged to produce evidence that the income that he is spending
during the period of prosecution is income of another year that he did not report
in his return of that year, when this is relied on as a defense, the accused runs
the risk of adversely influencing the jury by this admission, as well as possibly
building evidence for another prosecution.
When the burden of establishing the source of the net worth increase as
non-taxable income, at least in the period of prosecution, may very well be just
as much a burden on the defendant as on the government, there is no logical
reason for saying that this burden will be placed on the defendant. The reason-
ing of the license cases that it is much easier for the defendant to show a license
is not applicable here, as it may be just as hard for the accused to account for
the increases as for the prosecution to do so. In such a case the better rule would
seem to require the prosecution to assume the burden of proof, as it possesses
29 289 U.S. 89 (1933).
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the investigative facilities to make such a study, which the defense may not be
able to do.
As to the problem of the establishment of a non-taxable source of the tax-
payer's increases in net worth, in the situation where no reasonable leads are
given by the taxpayer, the burden seems to rest on the defendant under the net
worth cases. Even when the defendant furnishes what the Court calls reason-
able leads, all the government must do is to investigate them, but need not prove
the taxability of the source of the increase. The defendant now must account for
increases in his assets or run the risk of a conviction of a criminal violation of
the Internal Revenue Code.
THE CORROBORATION OF CONFESSION RULE
It is a well established rule that the defendant in a criminal case cannot be
convicted on his confession alone. There must be some other independent evi-
dence of the crime."0 The rationale of this rule is to prevent a conviction based
exclusively upon the statement of the defendant, which experience has proven
is often in error. It reduces the possibility of obtaining a conviction based on a
confession taken from the defendant by coercive means. Although there is a
rule against the admission of an involuntary confession, in many cases it may
be difficult or impossible for this to be established. Experience has often shown
that some individuals with psychotic disturbances will confess to a crime that
either was never committed or was committed by someone else. Many
times when a major crime is exposed in the headlines of the newspapers, the
police are confronted with at least one person who could not possibly have
committed the crime, but nevertheless confesses to same. In some instances
this type of individual has even been able to pass lie detector examinations while
maintaining guilt.
While the need of corroboration is universally accepted, there is a wide
divergence as to the extent of such corroborative evidence needed to admit the
confession or admission. Varying tests for the sufficiency of the corroborative
evidence have been promulgated by the courts. One test requires that there be
proof of the corpus delicti independent of the admission beyond reasonable
doubt. 1 Another view requires independent proof of the entire corpus delicti by
a preponderance of the evidence.82 Some courts have required substantial evi-
dence to establish independently the entire corpus delicti.15 The fourth view
calls for the prosecution to produce substantial independent evidence Which
would tend to establish the truthfulness of the statement.1 4 Evidence of the
corpus delicti is only necessary as to those elements not admitted. A final state-
90 Commonwealth v. Killion, 194 Mass. 153, 80 N.E. 222 (1907).
31 United States v. Fenwick, 177 F. 2d 488 (C.A. 7th, 1949).
4 Gray v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 380 (1882).
33 Forte v. United States, 94 F. 2d 236 (App. D.C., 1937).
31 Daeche v. United States, 250 Fed. 566 (C.A. 2d, 1918).
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ment of the corroboration rule requires that the independent evidence tend only
to establish the confession, with no need to establish the corpus delicti independ-
ently.I5
While the Supreme Court had previously required the corroboration of ad-
missions to have them introduced as evidence, the extent of the corroboration
that is necessary had not been determined by that Court. The net worth cases,
especially Smith v. United States,3" and the case of Opper v. United States,37
decided the same day, announce the rule of corroboration to be that it is suf-
ficient if the corroboration merely fortifies the truth of the confession, without
independently establishing the crime charged. In the Smith case the Court
states the rule:
All elements of the offense must be established by independent evidence or corrobo-
rated admissions, but one available mode of corroboration is for the independent evi-
dence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense "through" the state-
ments of the accused.3 8
The federal rule on the extent of corroboration of a confession or admission
thus, as a result of the net worth cases, is that the corpus delicti of a crime need
not be established independently of the admissions of the defendant, as long as
there is independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness
of the statement. That the rule will not be restricted to tax cases, where there
can be no establishment of a corpus delicti independent of the guilt of an indi-
vidual, is shown by the Opper case. That case was a prosecution for inducing a
federal employee to accept compensation for services to be rendered in connec-
tion with a federal contract. Although there was not sufficient evidence to es-
tablish the corpus delicti independent of the defendant's admissions, the other
evidence of the trustworthiness of the statements was sufficient corroboration,
and the conviction was affirmed.
Prior to the net worth cases, the federal courts showed little uniformity as to
the amount of corroboration necessary. All of the five previously enunciated
rules were followed at one time or another by the various lower federal courts,
making a specific rule hard to determine. 9 Two general lines of cases can be
perceived, however. One line follows the holding in Daeche v. United States4° to
the effect that the corroborative evidence is sufficient if it touches the corpus
delicti and it goes to fortify the truthfulness of the admission. This line of cases
now appears to be adopted by the Supreme Court. The other principal line of
38 Pearlman v. United States, 10 F. 2d 460 (C.A. 9th, 1926).
38 348 U.S. 147 (1954).
87 348 U.S. 84 (1954).
11 Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954).
11 Compare United States v. Fenwick, 177 F. 2d 488 (C.A. 7th, 1949) with Forte v.
United States, 94 F. 2d 236 (App. D.C., 1937), and Daeche v. United States, 250 Fed. 566
(C.A. 2d, 1918).
40 250 Fed. 566 (C.A. 2d, 1918).
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cases follows the case of Forte v. United States4' and requires substantial evi-
dence, independent of extra-judicial declarations by the defendant, of the entire
corpus delicti of the crime. Both of these principal rules have modifications.
With the adoption of the rule more favorable to the prosecution, the Su-
preme Court has made the use of the net worth method of proof much easier
because almost all of the cases involve some statement of the accused which the
government seeks to have admitted into evidence. With the easing of the re-
quirement as to corroboration thus making the extra-judicial admissions easier
to have admitted into evidence, the prosecution will be able to use more of the
statements of the taxpayer as evidence in a prosecution for tax evasion.
Probably the most important effects of the new corroboration rule will not
be in revenue law violation prosecutions, but rather in the general area of
criminal jurisprudence. Therefore in evaluating this rule, we must think in
terms of the average criminal prosecution, where the dangers of false confes-
sions and admissions are more acute. If we say that the reason for the rule-to
prevent a conviction based on a false confession alone-is a principle to be
encouraged, the question arises as to whether the present rule is sufficient to
effectuate its principle.
The liberal view adopted by the Court which does not require the crime to
be established independently, but allows the statements of the accused to fur-
nish some of the elements, seems not to accomplish the end desired. As an
example, in an arson prosecution the state establishes by independent evidence
that the building in question was destroyed by fire, but not the cause of the fire.
The defendant confesses to willfully setting fire to the structure. The inde-
pendent evidence of the fire with the admission of the defendant establishes the
corpus delicti of arson. Under the liberal view of corroboration all that is now
required to have the statement admitted into evidence is to offer some inde-
pendent proof of its truthfulness. This probably could be accomplished by
simply proving by the testimony of a witness that the defendant was at the
scene at the time the building burned. At this point there would apparently be
enough evidence to support a jury's verdict of conviction. This would in effect
allow a man to be imprisoned for the commission of a crime, the existence of
which depends upon his statement-a result which the corroboration rule was
originally intended to prevent. It is submitted that the rule as pronounced by
the Court, although it will ease the burden on prosecutors, seems not to be
compatible with our established concepts of criminal justice.
THE DANGERS OF THE SYSTEM
The Court, in passing on the net worth method of proof, chose from among
a number of certiorari petitions four cases which it believed to be representa-
tive of the problem.42 In giving its reason for taking the cases the Court stated:
4194 F. 2d 236 (App. D.C., 1937).
On January 10, 1955, the Supreme Court vacated the judgments in the other cases and
ordered them reconsidered in light of its opinion in the net worth cases, 348 U.S. 905 (1955).
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We concluded that the method involved something more than the ordinary use of
circumstantial evidence in the usual criminal case. Its bearing, therefore, on the safe-
guards traditionally provided in the administration of criminal justice called for a con-
sideration of the entire theory.4.3
Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the Court, pointed out a number of dangers
inherent in the net worth system of prosecution. When the taxpayer maintains
that he had a large hoard of money which should be taken into consideration in
his opening net worth figure, the jury might be prone to disbelieve him or, if
he is able to convince the jury, it might establish a fraud on his creditors which
would tend to prejudice the jury against him.
Another danger is that the jury might be too impressed with the exhibits
used by the government in this type of case. In the typical case, after the gov-
ernment accountants complete their calculations, they turn the figures over to
the government signpainters who proceed to make large, graphic, multi-colored
charts which portray the government's version of the taxpayer's financial his-
tory during the period of prosecution. The jury is allowed to take these charts
into the jury room, so that the possibility of the jury accepting the figures that
are graphically portrayed before them, without considering the merits of the
evidence the charts illustrate, is greatly enhanced. The Court suggests that the
instructions to the jury should be framed to guard against this risk of undue
prejudice.
A further risk to the defendant when facing a net worth prosecution is that
while he may know in his own mind that he had a larger opening net worth than
the government is willing to concede, nevertheless he may be unable to re-
member the specific details to adequately recount his financial history in such a
manner as to sound credible to a jury. If the transactions which give rise to this
accumulation occurred a long time ago, the inability of the taxpayer to recall
the facts would be natural.
Another time the testimony of the accused might tend to affect the jury
adversely is the instance where the defendant is seemingly evasive in answering
queries concerning his business transactions when in fact the lack of definite
answers is caused by his loose business methods. Therefore the individual who
does not have an adequate knowledge of his business transactions is placed in
greater jeopardy since the jury is apt to deduce concealment rather than a lack
of knowledge. It must be remembered in this regard that intent to evade taxes
is necessary to constitute the criminal offense and that the understatement of
income due to ignorance is not criminal.
The latter difficulty is especially important when the government shows
certain transactions during the year of prosecution which were not reflected in
the taxpayer's books. This fact could be due to willful concealment or inno-
cent mistake. All too often the jury is willing to jump to the conclusion that this
type of omission is purposeful, without other evidence tending to show this to
be true.
1" Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 124, 125 (1954).
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While the Court had no definitive solution to these problems, it cautioned
the lower courts to take them into consideration in each case, saying:
Trial courts should approach these cases in the full realization that the taxpayer may
be ensnared in a system which, though difficult for the prosecution to utilize, is equally
hard for the defendant to refute. Charges should be especially clear, including, in addi-
tion to the formal instructions, a summary of the nature of the net worth method, the
assumptions on which it rests, and the inferences available both for and against the
accused. Appellate courts should review the cases bearing constantly in mind the dif-
ficulties that arise when circumstantial evidence as to guilt is the chief weapon of a
method that is itself only an approximation. 41
CONCLUSION
While the Court indicated many problems created by the use of the net
worth system of prosecution, it did not seem to adequately supply the answers.
The entire responsibility for the necessary protection of the defendant's sub-
stantial rights was placed upon the trial court. The Court seems to indicate
that, while it authorizes the use of the method hesitantly, it relies basically on
the discretion of the trial judge to make certain that the government's investiga-
tion into the financial operations of the defendant was sufficient to establish a
true and complete picture of his taxable income. If in the opinion of the trial
judge the testimony and other evidence does not indicate a thorough investiga-
tion, it then becomes the duty of the trial court to remove the case from the
jury and direct a verdict of acquittal. Wide latitude is given by the Supreme
Court to the Courts of Appeals to ascertain whether the trial judge performed
this duty. It appears from the opinions that the Supreme Court is encouraging
the appellate courts to weigh the evidence rather than merely passing upon its
sufficiency, as is the usual practice at the appellate level.
If the case is determined to be sufficient to go to the jury, there still remains
the problem of drafting instructions properly framed so as to explain what is
required for the government to prove its case. Therefore the burden of prepar-
ing these technically accurate and practically complex instructions falls on the
attorneys who handle net worth cases. However the Court, while requiring a
clear statement of a complex cause of action, gives little if any indication to the
draftsman as to the framing of the instructions. It is therefore left to future cases
to determine what will constitute an adequate charge to the jury in a net worth
prosecution.
While the net worth system of prosecution has now received judicial ap-
proval from our highest Court, there is still a practical limitation to its wide-
spread use by the government. The investigation that is required in order to
build up this type of case is extensive and therefore expensive. The time and
manpower that is necessary to collect the evidence makes this method impracti-
cal in most cases since the Treasury Department has only a limited number of
men available for this type of work. This would limit the actual use of the sys-
44 Ibid., at 129.
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tern to the more flagrant cases. However, while the average taxpayer would not
be subjected to such a rigid examination, the ability of the government to prose-
cute on this basis might act as a deterrent to the possible wayward taxpayer.
The Holland, Friedberg, Smith, and Calderon cases, despite the Court's pro-
tests to the contrary, effectually shift the burden of proof to require that the
defendant establish his innocence and point up the importance of statements
made by the taxpayer to government agents during the preliminary investiga-
tion of his case. With the Court allowing the jury to accept the government's
statement of opening net worth, presume that unreported income is taxable
income, and infer willfulness on the part of the taxpayer for not reporting the
income, it is not difficult to conclude that the taxpayer now has the duty to es-
tablish his innocence. Much may be said on the side of the government about
the difficulty in establishing a criminal tax evasion due to the fact that the proof
of the source of income of an uncooperative taxpayer is difficult. The nature of
the crime is personal since it cannot be shown that the crime has been com-
mitted without identifying the perpetrator. And the classic argument may also
be used that we must protect the revenue and in order to do so we can not lay
down such stringent requirements to obtain a conviction that the average evader
would be able to escape retribution.
Most of the arguments of the prosecutor can be directed against many viola-
tions of the criminal law. It is submitted that the revenue laws should not be
accorded special treatment. While we grant that it is important for a govern-
ment to be able to obtain financial support from its citizens, we do not believe
that the necessity of reducing the traditional safeguards of our criminal proce-
dure has been adequately demonstrated.
It should be noted that the net worth method does not infringe upon the
rights of the taxpayer when used in a civil case to obtain back taxes and penal-
ties, since the presumption of innocence does not apply to a civil case. Because
of this, the protection of the revenue argument is weakened since the govern-
ment can obtain the money due it through a civil procedure without regard to
whether or not a criminal violation of the Internal Revenue Code occurred.
The shifting of the burden of proof thus seems unjustified.
Probably the principal lesson which should be learned from the net worth
cases is the danger of the taxpayer's conversations with agents of the govern-
ment. It can be seen that, at least in the Smith and Calderon cases, a conviction
would have been unobtainable without the assistance of the taxpayer himself.
Their admissions supplied some of the elements of the crime which the govern-
ment probably would have been unable to establish. Therefore the taxpayer
should be cautioned not to make statements concerning his tax liability when he
has any reason to believe that he might be accused of criminal tax evasion. In
those instances it is especially important that the taxpayer consult his attorney
before making any admissions concerning his income for a given year, whether
taxable or not, and his total assets as of a given date. The attorney should be
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careful when advising his client to sign a statement which appears to be part of
a civil tax liability, as this may later be used as the foundation for a criminal
prosecution.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the net worth cases, taken as a whole, tend
to weaken the position of the defendant, at least in this type of criminal prosecu-
tion. In this regard it should be noted that these cases have had their effect in
general criminal law already in so far as the corroboration rule is concerned.
Only time and subsequent cases will show how far the courts will be willing to
allow this liberalization of the criminal law to be extended. It is hoped that it
will not be too far.
REGULATION OF GAMBLING DEVICES IN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE
On January 2, 1951, Congress passed "An Act to Prohibit Transportation of
Gambling Devices in Interstate and Foreign Commerce."' This act, more popu-
larly called the Johnson Act, was designed to close the channels of interstate
commerce to slot machines and similar devices and, by so doing, to lessen
appreciably the revenue accruing to nation-wide crime syndicates.2 In addition,
it was hoped that this legislation would assist state and local law officers in the
enforcement of anti-gambling statutes . But in order to aid federal agencies in
enforcing this prohibition,' Congress imposed various restrictions and duties
which have run afoul of the courts and have raised some interesting problems
of constitutional law. As it shall be seen, the government has had some success
and some failure in enforcing these restrictions and duties.
It was not the intent of Congress that all gaming devices were to be pro-
hibited from interstate commerce. Specifically, it was stated that devices which
are played purely for amusement were not to be included in the provisions of
the act.' The act is restricted to two types of gambling devices, one of which
is the slot machine, while the other is that type of machine which is designed
and manufactured to be operated by a coin and to deliver money or a prize as
' 64 Stat. 1134 (1951), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1171-1177 (Supp., 1954).
Hearings on Legislation, House Report No. 2769, 81st Cong. 2nd Sess. (1950), 2 U.S.
Code Congressional Service 4240.
3 Ibid.
This statute, being penal in character, provides for fines and/or imprisonment for viola-
tions, and for confiscation of any device used in violation of the act. 64 Stat. 1135 (1951),
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1176-1177 (Supp., 1954).
' Committee Amendments, House Report No. 2769, 81st Cong. 2nd Sess. (1950), 2 U.S.
Code Congressional Service 4245.
